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Rights, served the double purpose of respecting the plurality of societal choices that characterises different polities, while at the same time enforcing a minimum level of protection which itself reacts to changes in social perception. As complex as the creation of an international human rights discourse might be, then, it is considerably simpler than its supranational counterpart. In the international sphere, there is no ambition to harmonise the fundamental rights discourse beyond what is required by the minimum floor of protection. In the supranational sphere, on the other hand, and as we shall see in more detail below, the emergence of a fundamental rights discourse might require the imposition of a sole standard (sometimes lower and sometimes higher than the national counterpart) in the protection of fundamental rights.
In this sense, the fundamental rights discourse in the European Union reflects the evolution of, and the tensions inherent in, the Union's constitutional process. In particular, the debate about fundamental rights protection mirrors the tension between federalisation and centralisation, and the deep worries which we have seen expressed in relation to the recent constitutional process. At both political and judicial level, there are in fact two conflicting forces, centripetal and centrifugal, in relation to fundamental rights protection. The centripetal force attracts the fundamental rights discourse within the European Union project, first as an ancillary goal and thenmore and more-as an aim in itself. 1 The centrifugal force, by contrast, seeks to pull away fundamental rights from the EU gravitational orbit. 2 The centripetal force reflects the development of the European Union in a more mature and comprehensive constitutional system, a system that has long stepped outside the confines of the internal market. The centrifugal force, on the other hand, reflects the desire to maintain a diversified and multifaceted constitutional system, where national sovereignty is seen as the source of the Union's own constitutional legitimacy.
This contribution seeks to explore these dynamics; in particular, it will be argued that if the fundamental rights discourse aims to serve a legitimising function, it must reflect these tensions and acknowledge that centralisation of fundamental rights is not always the answer. We will start by a short historical introduction of the development of fundamental rights discourse in the European Union, and then focus on the two forces at play, the centralising and the federalising force, in the case law of the The developments herein mentioned by no means exhaust the Union's activity in relation to fundamental rights protection. 12 Rather, they have been recalled for three reasons: first, because they constitute the expression at the highest political level of the emergence of a fundamental rights discourse in the Union's political and legal rhetoric; secondly, they illustrate well the dual dimension of such rhetoric, which seeks to impact on the European and on the national discourse; thirdly, they highlight the gradual process of transformation of the fundamental rights rhetoric from a political discourse to a legal one. However, in a second stage, the court seems eager to assess for itself the correct balance to be struck between competing interests when there is a Community element involved. The more interventionist approach is visible, for instance, in Carpenter, 29 where the assessment of the fundamental rights element appears to be predominant.
Interventionism is also apparent in those cases where the court instructs the national referring court to take into due account the fundamental rights of the claimant, even though it itself found no evidence of the existence of a barrier to intra-Community movement capable of bringing the matter within the scope of Community law.
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The more proactive approach towards fundamental rights protection, which might well reflect a change in the court's perception of its own role, is visible also in the case of Ferstersen. 31 There, rather unusually as well as unnecessarily, the court referred to the European Convention on Human Rights in scrutinising a residence requirement. In the case at issue, the question related to the compatibility with Justice, but is still left to the discretion of Member States. In this respect, the centralising effect is minimal, relating simply to a supervisory role of the court, and the 'federalising' tendency appears predominant. This said, there is a fourth line of case law which, while at first sight appearing similar to the Omega case law, is more problematic.
IV. Assessing Conflict of Rights
The fourth, and in my opinion more complex development, is that relating to the Schmidberger case law. 14 imports; and that it was justified having regard to the fundamental right of freedom of expression. At this point, it is useful to quote directly from the court's judgment:
77. The case thus raises the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the question of the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and of the free movement of goods, where the former are relied upon as justification for a restriction of the latter.
78. First, whilst the free movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental principles in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circumstances, be subject to restrictions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 [now 30] of that Treaty or for overriding requirements relating to the public interest … 79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are expressly recognised by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars of a democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express wording of paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued … 80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed … 81. In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between those interests.
The competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard. Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed upon intraCommunity trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights.

…
91. An action of that type usually entails inconvenience for non-participants, in particular as regards free movement, but the inconvenience may in principle be tolerated provided that the objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an opinion [emphasis added throughout].
At first sight, the Schmidberger ruling might appear both inoffensive and balanced.
After all, the end result is exactly what one might have expected and desired. And yet, the case signals a move towards centralisation which is qualitatively different and greater, since the effect of the court's interpretation is that of conferring upon itself the hermeneutic monopoly over the possible clash between a fundamental (noneconomic) right and a Treaty right. Here, consider that there is a substantial difference between this case and Omega. In the latter, what was at stake was a rule which, while aimed at the protection of fundamental rights, also directly restricted the enjoyment of one of the Treaty freedoms. In Schmidberger, on the other hand, what is at stake is not a direct barrier imposed by the state, but rather the failure of the state to curtail a fundamental right.
In the writer's opinion, the effect of the court's choice to define the legitimate exercise of fundamental rights as a barrier to Community movement is conceptually problematic. In particular, the following issues deserve closer attention.
First, even though the court accepts that fundamental rights might prevail even over the Treaty rights, it seems to put the two on the same level. As a result, the language used by the court is resonant of that used in relation to a clash of fundamental rights.
And yet, one should be careful in accepting this premise as one which can be constitutionally justified. The Treaty rights might well be 'fundamental' to the achievement of European integration, and they might well be very important to Union citizens, but they are radically and qualitatively different from fundamental human rights recognised by the European Convention or in bills of rights across Europe. The
Treaty rights are instrumental to the achievement of a political project; and they are rights which derive from a Treaty. Those rights would not, and do not, exist outside the Treaty providing for them. Furthermore, the constituency of right-holders is limited not only through the requirement of nationality; but also because those (Treaty) 'fundamental rights' are conditional upon movement and, in cases of mobility which is less transient in nature, also upon the satisfaction of given economic prerequisites, be those economic activity or economic independence.
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Fundamental rights, on the other hand, are those that we recognise, if not altogether inherent to, at least as being at the very core of our understanding of humanity. These rights do not necessarily need to be codified and are available to any person, 38 Ie for stays of more than three months: see The use of the same terminology, that of fundamental rights, to identify two radically different types of rights is thus debatable; it suggests a homogeneity which is not conceptually sound and might lead to the classification of those 'spurious' conflicts of rights as true clashes of fundamental rights. 41 And this erroneous classification is not simply a matter of terminology: rather, it might deceive as to the respective strength of competing claims; and as to the hermeneutic path that the interpreter should take in order to solve instances of conflict.
Secondly, the language of the court very much reflects this error in classification, leading to another flaw in the way in which the fundamental rights discourse is articulated in the jurisprudence. In Schmidberger, the court found that the failure of the Austrian authorities to ban the demonstration which led to an interruption in the Brenner motorway was to be qualified as a measure having equivalent effect; it therefore had to be 'objectively' justified. 42 The court then held that:
39 This is certainly true for the European Community or else it would have been impossible for the court to develop its general principles case law. 40 We shall not enter into the debate as to whether the drafters' intention of avoiding a hierarchy of rights in the Charter has been fulfilled; in any event the scope of the rights in the Charter, and therefore the extent to which they can be protected, varies considerably from right to right. In this respect, consider also the distinction between 'principles' and 'rights' as drawn in Art 52 (5) The problem with this line of reasoning is that it suggests the demotion of fundamental rights from 'individual' rights to public policy reasons; from fundamental rights to legitimate interests, albeit interests which might prevail even over the free movement of goods. Furthermore, while at first sight it might seem that the court either altogether rejects a hierarchy of rights; or privileges fundamental rights over Treaty rights, its analysis leads to the opposite conclusion, giving the impression of a hierarchical superiority of the Treaty rights over fundamental rights.
The stress is, in fact, on the limitation of the right to move in Community law:
freedom of expression is nothing but a limitation to this right which might (or might not) be legitimate.
The rest of the Schmidberger ruling confirms this reversal of priorities: thus, the Member State is called upon to justify the fact that it has not restricted a fundamental The fallacious premise which laid the foundation for the court's reasoning-that of the homogeneity between Treaty rights and fundamental rights-then leads it to reverse the fundamental rights discourse. Fundamental rights are transformed from individual rights to a 'legitimate interest', to public policy reasons; and the Treaty rights become a vehicle to impose upon Member States a restrictive approach to fundamental rights, so that the margin of appreciation is transformed from an instrument, however debatable, which acknowledges some pluralism in our understanding of the precise content of fundamental rights, into a useful tool to enforce the primacy of Treaty rights. Furthermore, this mode of reasoning determines two important consequences: first of all, it allows the court to claim a hermeneutic monopoly over the way in which conflicts between economic Treaty rights and fundamental rights are determined; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it deprives the interpreter of any useful framework to assess how these conflicts should be solved, which in turn might lead to a loss of legitimacy once a decision has been taken. We shall now turn to the two cases that brought these problems into greater light.
B. The Rulings in Viking and Laval
The Schmidberger case was an easy one: it was unsurprising that the court indicated that the Austrian authorities had not failed in their duties under Community law in allowing the demonstration to take place. And yet, as we have seen in the previous section, the reasoning of the court was conceptually flawed.
Those flaws were, in the eyes of many commentators, 45 fully exposed in two subsequent cases that dealt with the conflict between Treaty rights and fundamental rights. In both cases, the issue at stake related to the extent to which the exercise of collective action could be construed as a barrier to the free movement rights. In flagging of convenience of a ship 46 ; in Laval, coordinated collective action was taken in order to enforce local working conditions against a company which used foreign workers as posted workers. 47 The legal situation in those cases was slightly different from that at issue in Schmidberger in that, in the latter, the case arose as a result of a Francovich action taken against the state for its failure to protect the Treaty rights of the claimant, while in Viking and Laval, the Treaty was invoked directly by private parties against the trade unions.
Notwithstanding this difference, however, the starting premise of the Viking and
Laval rulings is the same as that in Schmidberger: the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which must be 'reconciled with the requirements relating to the rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality'. 48 The stress in favour of Treaty rights is even more pronounced in
Viking and Laval than it was in Schmidberger: it is the exercise of the fundamental right that must be proportionate. Thus, the traditional fundamental rights assessment 
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The fundamental rights rhetoric endorsed by the court in the early 1970s undoubtedly contributed to the legitimisation of the Communities/Union 50 ; and such legitimising function would have been impossible without a degree of centralisation.
In relation to Union acts, and given the principle of supremacy as well as the FotoFrost doctrine, 51 centralisation is not only desirable, but also essential to the Union's own functioning. 52 An act of the Union must be assessed in relation to the Union's own constitutional system. If a Union act is deemed unlawful, such an act must be void across the entire territory of the Union. In this respect, a limited degree of differentiation in fundamental rights protection is inevitable: the Union fundamental rights standard might be sometimes lower, and sometimes higher, than that which would be enforced at national level. 
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by the adjudicator, be that a court or the legislature, which transcend the legal process. 58 In other words, the hermeneutic process does not help in finding a solution to true clashes of rights and, in those cases, the balancing exercise reflects the preferences of the adjudicator.
However, Zucca claims that true clashes of rights are much rarer than one might think. Rather, the majority of cases, those which he identifies as spurious clashes of rights, involve a clash between a right and a public interest. Here, the adjudicator might engage in a more fruitful balancing exercise, since the balancing exercise focuses on the very definition of the right at stake. Thus, hermeneutic principles and legal reasoning can perform their full function, very much in the same way as when the European Court of Justice is defining the scope of the Treaty freedom and the extent to which Member States can invoke a public interest to limit those freedoms.
The qualification of the clash between Treaty rights and fundamental freedoms as a clash of rights then distorts the perspective, leaving us in the dark as to the way in which the respective strengths of the competing claims should be assessed. Here, it is argued that a more correct classification might be helpful in the process of adjudication. This is not only important for the sake of national courts and legal clarity; it is also crucial in order to bestow legitimacy onto the entire process.
Otherwise, adjudication might be seen as transcending the hermeneutic dimension and become instead a political exercise. Here, consider the following.
The ECJ approached the Schmidberger-type problem in the following way: right, Schmidberger/Viking style, then the role of the European Court of Justice will be predominant and the latter will gain a monopoly in assessing the mutual strengths of the conflicting claims.
The way in which we choose to articulate a legal problem is of paramount importance, not only because it might determine the outcome of the case, but because it ensures the legitimacy of the adjudicating process. While it might be naive to believe that adjudication occurs in a political vacuum, the adjudicator cannot be seen as forcing his or her own societal/economic/ideological preferences as a matter of course. If the hermeneutic premises are faulty, the process of adjudication will be not only faulty, but will risk being de-legitimised. Cases involving clashes of fundamental rights are probably the most difficult to solve and surely the most controversial. However, when a court, be it national or supranational, fails to articulate its own discourse, it risks being accused of moving into a realm that it does not pertain to it, that of pure politics. Furthermore, if the legal reasoning is not articulated, it is impossible to predict.
VI. Conclusions
The development of a fundamental rights discourse in the European Union has undoubtedly strengthened the Union's constitutional foundations as well as its democratic credentials. This discourse has been embraced by all of the institutional actors at European level: if national court and European Court of Justice have provided the original impetus, the political institutions have been more than ready to provide their own contribution to the development of a fundamental rights discourse in the EU. However, the process through which the fundamental rights rhetoric is developed is far from being linear: rather, it reflects the Union's own constitutional idiosyncrasies. In this respect, the articulation of the fundamental rights discourse at the political level might appear rather schizophrenic, with different forces puling in opposite directions. These opposing forces are visible also in the case law of the European Court of Justice, albeit, naturally, the centralising force has been predominant in the court's discourse. While this centralisation is fully justified in relation to most of the case law, to either ensure the proper functioning of the Union 27 or the protection of individuals, in cases involving a clash of rights, such a centralising approach is more debatable. In this case, centralisation is the result of a false premise, that of an ontological homogeneity between Treaty rights and fundamental rights. This false premise determines both the artificial strengthening of some claims vis-a-vis others, solely because of the existence of a cross-border element, and also the imposition of the court's hermeneutic monopoly. Furthermore, the fallacious starting point determines the impossibility of ascertaining the reasons behind the adjudicating process. However, once the legal discourse is articulated in a different way, so that the competing fundamental rights are properly identified, it is possible to correct these distortions and to ensure a hermeneutically consistent system. And once the competing claims are identified for what they are, and the Community interest is properly identified as no more than a public interest, the process of adjudication becomes more transparent, as well as being properly relocated in the hands of the national judiciary. After all, centralisation is not always the answer.
